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OPINION OF THE COURT

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes on before this Court on appeal and
cross-appeal from an order of the District Court entered on
December 30, 2008, granting summary judgment against
plaintiff Patty Lee Smith and in favor of defendant Johnson
and Johnson (“J&J”). We will affirm on Smith’s appeal but
will dismiss J&J’s cross-appeal.

II. BACKGROUND
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From April 2006 to October 2006, McNeill Pediatrics,
a J&J wholly-owned subsidiary, employed Smith in the
position of Senior Professional Sales Representative. In
essence, Smith’s position required her to travel to various
doctors’ offices and hospitals where she extolled the benefit
of J&J’s pharmaceutical drug Concerta to the prescribing
doctors. J&J hoped that the doctors, having learned about the
benefits of Concerta, would choose to prescribe this drug for
their patients. Smith, however, did not sell Concerta (a
controlled substance) directly to the doctors, as such sales are
prohibited by law.
J&J gave Smith a list of target doctors that it created
and told her to complete an average of ten visits per day,
visiting every doctor on her target list at least once each
quarter. To schedule visits with reluctant doctors, Smith had
to be inventive and cultivate relationships with the doctor’s
staff, an endeavor in which she found that coffee and donuts
were useful tools. J&J left the itinerary and order of Smith’s
visits to the target doctors to her discretion. The J&J target
list identified “high-priority” doctors that issued a large
number of prescriptions for Concerta or a competing product,
and Smith could choose to visit high-priority doctors more
than once each quarter. J&J gave her a budget for these visits
and she could use the money in the budget to take the doctors
to lunch or to sponsor seminars.
At the meetings, Smith worked off of a prepared
“message” that J&J provided her, although she had some
discretion when deciding how to approach the conversation.
J&J gave her pre-approved visual aids and did not permit her
to use other aids. J&J trained its representatives to gauge a
4

doctor’s interest and knowledge about the product, eventually
building to a “commitment” to prescribe the drug.
In Smith’s deposition she made it clear that she
appreciated the freedom and responsibility that her position
provided. Though a supervisor accompanied Smith during
the doctor visits on a few days each quarter, by her own
calculation Smith was unsupervised 95% of the time. As
Smith explained during her deposition, “[i]t was really up to
me to run the territory the way I wanted to. And it was not a
micromanaged type of job. I had pretty much the ability to
work it the way I wanted to work it.” App. at 54. According
to Smith’s job description, she was required to plan and
prioritize her responsibilities in a manner that maximized
business results. J&J witnesses testified (and J&J documents
confirmed) that Smith was the “expert” on her own territory
and was supposed to develop a strategic plan to achieve
higher sales.
Before her visits, Smith completed pre-visit reports to
help her select the correct strategy for that day’s visits. At the
end of her day, Smith completed post-visit reports
summarizing the events of the visits. Smith would refer back
to this information before her next visit to the same doctors.
After adding up the time she spent writing pre-visit reports,
driving, conducting the visits, writing post-visit reports, and
completing other tasks, Smith worked more than eight hours
per day.
Smith earned a base salary of $66,000 but was not paid
overtime, though J&J, at its discretion, could award her a
bonus. J&J considered the number of Concerta prescriptions
5

issued in Smith’s territory in determining her bonus. The
collection of this data and its direct relationship to Smith’s
efforts was, however, subject to error as purchasers might fill
their prescriptions in another territory or with a pharmacy that
would not release the pertinent information to J&J.
Smith filed suit seeking overtime pay under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq.
After discovery, including most significantly Smith’s
deposition, revealed the facts that we just summarized, J&J
moved for summary judgment, arguing that she was not
entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA because she was
exempt from that statute under either the “outside salesman”
exemption or the “administrative employee” exemption. 29
U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (statutory exemptions). Smith urged the
District Court to deny J&J’s motion for summary judgment
and, instead, to grant a motion that she filed to certify the case
as a class action.1
The District Court addressed these motions in an
opinion and order, both dated December 30, 2008. Smith v.
Johnson and Johnson, No. 06-4787, 2008 WL 5427802

1

Smith’s situation is not unique, and cases similar to this one are
pending in the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Ninth
Circuits. Our opinion, however, focuses on Smith and the
specific facts developed in discovery in this case. Consequently,
we recognize that based on different facts, courts, including this
Court, considering similar issues involving sales representatives
for other pharmaceutical companies, or perhaps even for J&J,
might reach a different result than that we reach here.
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(D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2008). The Court analyzed the outside
salesman exemption first, but found that it did not apply to
Smith. When it turned to the administrative employee
exemption, its result was different as the Court found that it
did apply to Smith. Accordingly, the Court granted J&J
summary judgment. In view of the Court’s substantive ruling,
Smith’s motion for class action certification became moot and
the Court denied it.
Smith then filed this appeal, and J&J filed a crossappeal. We will affirm on Smith’s appeal but dismiss the
cross-appeal.2

2

J&J’s cross-appeal urges us to affirm on the alternate basis of
the outside salesman exemption. Yet a party, without taking a
cross-appeal, may urge in support of an order from which an
appeal has been taken any matter appearing in the record, at
least if the party relied on it in the district court. See United
States v. American Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435, 44 S.Ct.
560, 564 (1924).
Consequently, J&J’s cross-appeal is
superfluous and we will dismiss it. See Kontakis v. Beyer, 19
F.3d 110, 112 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994). But the dismissal does not
change the arguments at issue, though it establishes that J&J
should not have filed its reply brief in support of its crossappeal. We have disregarded that brief inasmuch as J&J should
not enjoy the benefit of having an opportunity for extra briefing
due to its own procedural error. Indeed, in its brief J&J recited
that it recognized that it could have raised the outside salesman
exemption without a cross-appeal but that it filed the “notice of
cross-appeal out of an abundance of caution.” Appellee’s br. at
3 n.3. We can understand J&J’s counsel’s caution with respect
7

III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction over the FLSA
claims under 29 U.S.C. § 216 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We
have jurisdiction over Smith’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We exercise plenary review over a grant of summary
judgment and apply the same standard used by the District
Court. Jefferson Bank v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 965 F.2d
1274, 1278 (3d Cir. 1992); Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp.,
901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(c) sets forth the standard for summary judgment
and states that summary judgment shall be granted only if
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” To be
material, a disputed fact must be one that might “affect the
outcome of the suit under governing law.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510
(1986). We draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-movant. Meyer v. Riegel Prods. Corp., 720 F.2d 303,
307 n.2 (3d Cir. 1983).

IV. DISCUSSION

to filing a notice of cross-appeal, but it should not have filed the
reply brief on the cross-appeal without leave of this Court, as it
recognized that the cross-appeal probably was not necessary.
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Under the FLSA, employees who work more than 40
hours per week are entitled to overtime pay unless they fall
within one of the FLSA’s exemptions. 29 U.S.C. §§ 207,
213. The FLSA is remedial and is construed broadly, but
exemptions to it are construed narrowly i.e., against the
employer. Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia, 527 F.3d 299,
310 (3d Cir. 2008). Congress has empowered the Secretary of
Labor to define and delimit the terms of the FLSA’s
exemptions by regulation.
29 U.S.C. § 213(a).
The
Secretary’s regulations, which were promulgated using
notice-and-comment procedures, have controlling weight
unless found to be arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statute. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843–44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782 (1984). The
District Court held that the administrative employee
exemption applied to Smith, so we focus on the regulations
describing that exemption. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.200–.204.
Under the administrative employee exemption, anyone
employed in a bona fide administrative capacity is exempt
from the FLSA’s overtime requirements. 29 U.S.C. §
213(a)(1). The Secretary has defined an administrative
employee as someone:
(1) Compensated on a salary or fee basis at a
rate of not less than $455 per week . . .
exclusive of board, lodging or other facilities;
(2) Whose primary duty is the performance of
office or non-manual work directly related to
the management or general business operations
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of the employer or the employer’s customers;
and
(3) Whose primary duty includes the exercise of
discretion and independent judgment with
respect to matters of significance.
29 C.F.R. §§ 541.200. The parties agree that Smith’s
salary qualifies her for the administrative employee
exemption, but dispute her qualification for that exemption
under the remaining two sections.
We find that the administrative employee exemption
applies to Smith. While testifying at her deposition Smith
elaborated on the independent and managerial qualities that
her position required. Her non-manual position required her
to form a strategic plan designed to maximize sales in her
territory.
We think that this requirement satisfied the
“directly related to the management or general business
operations of the employer” provision of the administrative
employee exemption because it involved a high level of
planning and foresight, and the strategic plan that Smith
developed guided the execution of her remaining duties. See
29 C.F.R. § 541.203(e) (“Human resources managers who
formulate, interpret or implement employment policies and
management consultants who study the operations of a
business and propose changes in organization generally meet
the duties requirements for the administrative exemption.”);
Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 1, 3–5, 12 (1st
Cir. 1997) (applying administrative employee exemption to
marketing representatives who dealt with licensed
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independent insurance agents who, in turn, dealt with
purchasers of insurance products).
When we turn to the “exercise of discretion and
independent judgment with respect to matters of significance”
requirement, we note that Smith executed nearly all of her
duties without direct oversight. In fact, she described herself
as the manager of her own business who could run her own
territory as she saw fit. Given these descriptions, we conclude
that Smith was subject to the administrative employee
exemption. Cf. Cote v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 558 F.
Supp. 883, 886-87 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (applying administrative
employee exemption to medical “detailer” even though
description of employee’s duties was more parsimonious than
Smith’s description of her duties here).
Smith nevertheless has asked us to limit the
significance of her testimony and find that she lacked
discretion with respect to matters of significance. Indeed, her
attorney contended at oral argument on this appeal that Smith
overinflated her importance during the deposition, and that we
should consider her statements mere puffery.
We are
unwilling to ignore Smith’s testimony to hold that there is an
issue of material fact merely because of Smith’s request that
we do so. In this regard, we point out that when Smith
testified she surely understood the significance of her
testimony in the context of this case. In the circumstances
before us, we accept Smith’s deposition testimony as an
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accurate description of her position and thus we will affirm
the order granting J&J summary judgment.3
In reaching our result we have not overlooked our
opinion in Martin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896
(3d Cir. 1991), on which Smith heavily relies. Rather, we
find that Cooper is distinguishable on the facts. Moreover, we
agree with the District Court that changes in the Secretary’s
regulations since Cooper make that case inapplicable here.
See Smith, 2008 WL 5427802, at *8-9.4

V. CONCLUSION

3

We also point out that although the “sham affidavit” doctrine is
not applicable here, the principle of that doctrine surely is.
Under the sham affidavit doctrine a court will disregard an
affidavit inconsistent with an affiant’s prior deposition
testimony when a party moves for summary judgment on the
basis of the deposition unless the party relying on the affidavit
in opposition to the motion can present a legitimate reason for
the discrepancies between the deposition and the affidavit. See
Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609, 623-25 (3d Cir. 2004). We do not
regard Smith’s counsel’s contention that Smith’s deposition
testimony was puffery as a reason to disregard the deposition.
4

Inasmuch as we affirm the District Court’s application of the
administrative employee exemption, we do not address the
question of the applicability of the outside salesman exemption.
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The District Court’s order of December 30, 2009 in
No. 09-1223 will be affirmed and J&J’s cross-appeal in No.
09-1292 will be dismissed. The parties will bear their own
costs on this appeal.
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